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Summary 
This paper aims to examine the impacts of oil-price shocks on China’s price levels. To that 
end, we develop a partial transmission input-output model that captures the uniqueness of 
the Chinese market. We hypothesize and simulate price control, market factors and 
technology substitution - the three main factors that restrict the functioning of a price pass-
through mechanism during oil-price shocks. Using the models of both China and the U.S., 
we separate the impact of price control from those of other factors leading to China’s price 
stickiness under oil-price shocks. The results show a sharp contrast between China and the 
U.S., with price control in China significantly preventing oil-price shocks from spreading into 
its domestic inflation, especially in the short term. However, in order to strengthen the 
economy’s resilience to oil-price shocks, the paper suggests a gradual relaxing of price 
control in China. 
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This paper aims to examine the impacts of oil-price shocks on China’s price levels. 
To that end, we develop a partial transmission input-output model that captures 
the uniqueness of the Chinese market. We hypothesize and simulate price control, 
market factors and technology substitution - the three main factors that restrict the 
functioning of a price pass-through mechanism during oil-price shocks. Using the 
models of both China and the U.S., we separate the impact of price control from 
those of other factors leading to China’s price stickiness under oil-price shocks. 
The results show a sharp contrast between China and the U.S., with price control 
in China significantly preventing oil-price shocks from spreading into its domestic 
inflation, especially in the short term. However, in order to strengthen the 
economy’s resilience to oil-price shocks, the paper suggests a gradual relaxing of 
price control in China. 
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1.  Introduction 
1.1. Oil-price Shocks and China’s Economic Performance 
Inflationary impacts of oil-price shocks have always concerned oil importing 
countries. China’s dependence of oil imports has increased by more than 30% 
over the past decade, implying that China is becoming more sensitive or even 
more vulnerable to external oil price shocks. However, China’s economy has 
managed to maintain a stunning growth for the past 10 years, despite the rapid 
increase of world oil prices since 2003. China’s oil consumption continues to 
expand largely unaffected by the most oil-price shocks (see Figure 1). Most 
notably, China’s economy maintained its growth momentum in the recent oil-price 
spurring period of 2007 to 2008, during which time China’s consumer price index 
(CPI) was far less influenced than other developed nations (see Figure 2).   
Like many other emerging countries, China’s economic development is 
characterized by high energy intensity and low energy efficiency. While the oil 
intensity of economic output has been decreasing during past several years, it is 
still much higher than other developed economies in absolute terms. A relatively 
high oil intensity for GDP, combined with China’s increasing dependence on oil 
imports, would make China vulnerable to international oil-price shocks. However, 






Fig.1 Oil consumption of China vs. the world’s average crude oil price 
Sources: Oil consumption from British Petroleum (2008); world oil prices from 
the U.S. Energy Information Administration (2010). 
 
 
Fig.2 A comparison of CPI in China, EU, and the U.S. vs. the world’s average 
oil price 




(2010) and the OECD (2010); CPI for the U.S. calculated from the original data 
from Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U.S. Department of Labor (2011); world oil 
prices from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (2010). 
 
1.2. Oil-price Shocks and China’s Price Control Policy 
Relying on theoretical verification and empirical observation, we would like to 
hypothesize that China’s lessened vulnerability may be partly due to China’s price 
control policy. Despite the continuous efforts towards price liberalization, a 
certain level of price control is still imposed on China’s economy.   
In China, price control policy targets two kinds of commodities: 
fundamental resources and CPI-indexed commodities. Since those industries 
producing the first category of commodities are prone to be monopolized, price 
control is implemented mainly to prevent the monopoly from encroaching on 
public interest. Measures taken are to keep their profit at reasonable levels. For 
the second category, price control is enforced to restrain inflation and to mitigate 
the impact of price turbulence on the general public’s lives. Price control policy 
has acted as a useful tool in controlling inflation in China for a long period of time. 
However, what remains unknown is the extent of this price control, and most 
importantly, how this extent of price control has influenced China’s responses to 





1.3. Recent Studies 
Over the past decade, there has been a growing body of literature that has 
examined China’s economic development under international oil-price shocks. 
Adopting a VAR model, Du et al. (2010) find that while China’s GDP growth is 
positively correlated with the world oil price, oil-price shocks can have a 
significant impact on domestic inflation. Faria et al. (2009) examine the reasons 
behind the rapid expansion of the Chinese exports under oil-price shocks. Huang 
and Guo (2007) investigate the impact of oil-price shocks on China’s real 
exchange rate.   
However, not until recently have researchers brought the issue of China’s 
sticky oil price pass-through into their research framework. Tang et al. (2010) 
observe China’s price stickiness in the oil price pass-through, and using a SVAR 
model they show that price stickiness and rigidity of investment in a short period 
make the impact of oil-price shocks on China’s economy gradual but permanent. 
Using an input-output model, Ren et al. (2007) measure the impact of oil price on 
China’s price index and attribute the stickiness of China’s oil price pass-through to 
such factors as market competition, price control and energy substitution.   
Despite the number of studies focused on China’s partial oil-price 
transmission mechanism, it is still unclear how different factors have contributed 
to the stickiness of China’s oil price pass-through. In particular, how and to what 




development under recurring international oil-price shocks? To address these 
questions, we will develop a unique China model in the remaining part of this 
paper. Section 2 introduces the modeling framework of our analysis. We tailor the 
traditional input-output method to better reflect the uniqueness of China’s reality. 
In Section 3, we manage to separate the effect of price control from that of other 
factors leading to China’s price stickiness under oil-price shocks, using the partial 
transmission input-output models of both China and the U.S.. Section 4 discusses 
some policy implications. The conclusions are drawn in Section 5. 
 
 
2.  The Model 
The input-output (IO) analysis is a powerful tool in determining the gradual 
inflationary effect of oil-price shocks. Therefore, we have adopted an IO 
framework for our study. However, given the built shortcomings in the traditional 
IO model, we have developed a partial transition IO model to better reflect the 
imperfect market conditions in China. 
 
2.1. Why Input-output Analysis? 





First, IO modeling is specialized in analyzing the “cost-driven inflation”, 
while China’s inflation observed during the last oil-price shock is just 
characterized as “cost-driven”, during which time international market had seen 
steep rise in metal, energy and grain prices - which largely led to China’s high 
inflation rate during the period. Secondly, an oil-price shock is gradually realized 
through the inter-connection between industries. Meanwhile, the IO table gives a 
comprehensive structural description of the entire economy in a particular year
 
(Carter, 1974; Leontief, 1986). Therefore by using the information provided by an 
IO table, an IO model enables us to dissect the complex interdependencies of 
industries within an economy, and measure the complete inflationary effect of 
oil-price shocks. Thirdly, while other empirical methods ignore the indirect or 
ripple effects, an IO analysis allows to capture inter-industry linkages and 
measures both the direct and indirect effects of oil-price shocks (Christian and 
Klaus, 2009, Liu and Ren, 2006). 
 
2.2. Traditional Input-output Analysis 
Major Consumptions 
Three main consumptions are built in an IO analysis: 
First, the demand-driven nature. All input requirements for the production of some 
exogenously given demand will be automatically and instantaneously met. 




completely and instantaneously transmitted to downstream industries. Thirdly, 
fixed technical coefficients. The cost reduction efforts made by manufacturers 
through technology innovation are not considered. 
The demand-driven nature of an IO model may not be justifiable for a 
Western economy (Giarrantani, 1976); however, given the abundant unused 
capacity of China, this assumption may work for our analysis. The “instant 
transmission” assumption of an IO model ignores any possible impediment in the 
transmission of oil-price shocks; and thus exaggerates the effect of oil-price 
shocks. Since this is usually not the case in reality, we will ease this assumption in 
Section 2.3. The ignorance of technical innovations in an IO model may not be 
justifiable in the long term; however, this may reflect the short-term reality in 
China. As we will further discuss in Section 4, the price control in China actually 
discourages manufacturers from applying energy-saving technologies to reduce 
their costs when oil price rises. 
  
Traditional Input-output Methodology 
Under the assumptions discussed above, a price increase in industry i of  i p Δ  will 
lead to a cost rise in industry j, which uses products from industry i by  ii j pa Δ , 
where  ij a  is the corresponding direct requirement coefficient. Likewise, to keep 




12 , 1, 1 ... ...
T
ii i i i i i i n pa a a a a −+ ⎡⎤ Δ ⎣⎦ , 
with the matrix form of 
T
ii pa Δ , where  i a   represents the vectors in row i 
excluding  ii a . This reflects the first-round effect of a price shock in the upstream 
industry. 
The price rise of other products incurred by the initial price surge in 
industry i will gradually lead to the ripple effects on other industries. The second 
round of a price shock can be shown by   
()
T
ii paA Δ , or 
TT




ii paA A Δ⋅ , or 
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ii pA a Δ  
for the third round…The total inflationary effects of the initial price shock can be 
summarized into   
23 1 [( ) ( ) . . . ] ( 1 )
TT T T T T T T
ii i i i i i p a A aA aA a pA a
− Δ++ + = Δ − . 
This is the famous Leontief’s inversion method (Leontief, 1986). It 
represents both the direct and indirect impacts of a price shock, initiated from 
industry  i on other industries. The Leontief’s inversion method enables us to 
calculate the total effect of a price shock. In order to further analyze the marginal 
changes in price level under oil-price shocks, we will adopt the iteration method 





2.3. Partial Transmission Input-output Model 
As the traditional IO model reflects the inflationary effect of a price shock in an 
ideal world, the ultimate impact of the initial price surge is certainly not as 
significant and swift as the model indicates, due to a number of factors, such as 
market competition pressure, technology innovation, energy substitution, etc. 
Most notably, price control policies on certain commodities are still implemented 
in China today, suggesting the need to modify the traditional IO model to better 
reflect the real economy and derive the realistic results. In this section, we will 
introduce some new concepts into the traditional IO model. Specifically, we will 
incorporate the “frictions” in China’s price transmission mechanism into the 
traditional IO model, quantify the impacts of such frictions and thus better 
simulate the price pass-through during an oil-price shock. 
 
Capability of Transmitting Cost 
Since the real price adjustment scale may not be as great as the cost increase level, 
we use the ratio of “real price increase” to “ideal price increase” to reflect the 
capability of an industry in transmitting its cost pressure to downstream industries. 
Here the “ideal price increase” equals the weighted average cost increase, 
assuming that an upstream manufacturer can fully transmit its cost increase to 
downstream manufacturers. The cost increase for each input is derived from CPI 




corresponding columns in the IO direct requirement tables. We term this ratio as 
“capability of transmitting cost (CTC)”.
2  






= ∑ as the weighted 
cost increase or “ideal price increase”. Therefore, the “capability of transmitting 














CTC is a row vector. Intuitively, the greater the capability of transmitting 
cost, the greater the ability of industry to pass cost pressures to other industries by 
raising its price. The empirical results of CTC are shown in Section 3. Given the 
values of CTC, we can understand how under a certain level of cost increase, 
producers are capable of transmitting their cost pressures or to what level they can 
raise their prices. 
 
Partial Transmission IO Model 
Arguably, CTC contains valuable information regarding frictions in price 
transmission mechanism. In light of this, our next step is to modify the “direct 
                                                             
2 Ren et al. (2008) introduce the concept of “capability of transmitting cost” in 
order to illustrate the capability of different industries in transmitting cost pressure 
during inflation. Here we broaden the scope of its application by incorporating 




requirement table” by using the CTC matrix. By using the modified direct 
requirement table, our aim is to create a “partial transmission IO model”, which 
considers price transmission frictions on top of IO relations between industries. 
The modified direct requirement table is denoted as  ' A   
T 'C ij j ij A CT A = ⋅ , 
and 
  a' ij j ij CTC a = ⋅ . 
' A  is obtained by multiplying every coefficient in the original direct 
requirement table by the corresponding “capability of transmitting cost” of the 
output industry. Using the modified direct requirement table  ' A , the total impact 
of an oil-price shock on inflation can be obtained by summarizing all rounds of 
price shocks, calculated by means of   
23 [( ') ' ( ') ( ' ) ( ') ( ' ) ( ') ...]
TTT TT TT
ii i i i pa A a A a A a Δ+ + + . 
Here,  
a' ij j ij CTC a = ⋅ .  
a' ij contains information from both sides: the cost composition (from the 
original direct requirement coefficient) and the capability of transmitting cost for 
each industry. For example, when cost of the ith input of the jth industry increases 
by x%, with all other costs remaining unchanged, it will increase the cost of the jth 




CTCj (in percentages) of its cost rise, the initial price increase should be 
(x*aij*CTCj), i.e. (x*aij’). This initial price increase will then spread into other 
industries, thus resulting in a cost-driven inflation. Because this new IO model 
reflects baffled price transmission mechanism in reality, we call it the “partial 
transmission input-output model”. 
 
2.4. Multi Scenario Analysis 
With the partial transmission IO model introduced above, we will now develpe 
two scenarios, using data from both China and the U.S., in an effort to identify 
factors in blocking price pass-through during oil-price shocks. We take the U.S. as 
a reference because it is considered as the freest market in the world, with little 
intervention from the government. Most of the frictions in price transmission in 
the U.S. result from the market itself, rather than price control policies of the 
government. On the contrary, the baffled price transmission mechanism in China 
is a result of both government intervention and market factors. Therefore, a 
comparison between China and the U.S. scenarios can give us valuable 
information regarding the relative impact of different transmission frictions in 
price pass-through mechanisms. 
 




Under this scenario, we ignore the factors that baffle a price pass-through during 
an oil-price shock, and use the traditional IO method to determine the maximum 
impact of an oil-price shock on general price level. Simulation results of a 
hypothetical 100% oil-price increase under this scenario are derived using data 
from both China and the U.S. (see Section 3). 
 
Scenario II: Partial Transmission 
Under the assumption that price adjustment is baffled by distorted price 
mechanism, we use the “partial transmission IO model” to simulate the inflation 
level during a hypothetical oil-price shock. Arguably, simulation results in both 
countries under this scenario should be smaller and more plausible compared with 
that under Scenario I. 
 
 
3.  Data, Empirical Results and Discussion   
3.1. Data 
















ij a comes from direct IO tables. Here we use the 2007 China IO table (National 
Bureau of Statistics of China, 2009) and the 2002 U.S. benchmark IO table 
(Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department of Commerce, 2008), both 
of which are the latest available IO tables. 
For  i rp Δ , we use relevant monthly CPI and PPI (producer price index) 
indices between July 2007 and July 2008 to calculate “real price increase” from 
July 2007 to July 2008. Similarly, we use the corresponding CPI and PPI indices 
during the same period to represent cost increase ( i p Δ ) of different inputs for 
different industries. 
The reason why we use price variance data from July 2007 to July 2008 is 
because, to calculate CTC, we need to choose a period during which many 
industries face cost surges so that we can observe whether producers are 
sufficiently able to increase their prices. Meanwhile, the world has experienced 
unprecedented oil-price shocks over the same period, during which the world’s 
average crude oil price rose from 73 to 134 US$/barrel. As a result, both China 
and the U.S. have seen sharp increases in the inflation rates (see Figure 2). This 
enables us to observe producers’ responses to wide-spread cost surges and 
quantify their capability of transmitting costs. 
 
3.2. Capability of Transmitting Cost 




with patterns widely differentiated between China and the U.S.. 
 
Table 1 
Ten Chinese industries with the highest CTCs and ten with the lowest CTCs 
 
Industries with the highest 
CTCs 
CTC 
Industries with the lowest 
CTCs 
CTC 
Financial services  13.18   
Information, computer services 
and software 
-1.03  
Oil and gas extraction  8.37   
Communications equipment, 
computer and other electronic 
instrument manufacturing 
-0.96  
Waste products and materials  5.75   
Culture, sports and 
entertainment 
-0.29  
Agriculture, forestry, fishing and 
herding 
4.46   Post  services  0.00  
Coal mining  4.01   
Electric power, heat generation, 
transmission and distribution 
0.15  




Nonmetallic mineral mining and 
quarrying 
2.39  
Device, office equipment 
manufacturing 
0.16  
Real  estate  2.06   Chemistry  0.24  






Research and experiment  1.52   











Industries with the highest 
CTCs 
CTC 
Industries with the lowest 
CTCs 
CTC 
Securities, commodity contracts, 
investments, and related activities 
31.18   Computer and peripheral 
equipment manufacturing 
-262.50 
Oil and gas extraction  24.60    Funds, trusts, and other 
financial vehicles 
-3.95 
Monetary authorities, credit 
intermediation and related 
activities 
13.88  
Owner-occupied dwellings  -2.89 
Legal services  10.87    Travel arrangement and 
reservation services 
-2.43 
Water, sewage and other systems  10.59    Lessors of nonfinancial 
intangible assets 
-2.13 












Wholesale trade  7.39    Radio and television 
broadcasting 
-0.96 
Management, scientific, and 
technical consulting services 




The industries “oil and gas extraction” of both countries are among the 
top-10 CTC list, indicating that oil and gas prices are more driven by demand 
factors rather than cost turbulence. However, China has more mining industries on 
the top-10 CTC list (coal mining, metal ores mining, etc), implying better 




the real estate industry have similar high levels of CTCs in both China and the 
U.S., consistent with the common sense that these industries set prices according 
to the benchmark price level (often set by influential manufacturers in the 
industry), rather than their costs. As for industries with the lowest CTCs, China 
and the U.S. follow more or less the same pattern: information-related industries 
occupy most of the list; their negative CTCs imply that prices in these industries 
are mostly irrelevant to their manufacturing costs, revealing their vulnerability 
under a general price surge.   
While some industries have CTCs well above 1 (notice those industries 
with the highest CTCs), other industries have very low CTCs (far less than 1), 
indicating little discretion in price adjustment under oil-price shocks. The reason 
behind manufacturers raising prices beyond cost hikes is indeed very complex. 
While the cost of production is among the most important factors in pricing, other 
factors cannot be neglected. For example, price turbulence in global market, 
demand surge in local market, perceived reliability of supply and supply 
disruption as a result of natural disasters and other unexpected events, either 
individually or in combination, would lead to dramatic price hikes where the cost 
of production has not markedly increased. Moreover, it is likely that industries 
having CTC larger than 1 would have taken advantage of cost hikes (e.g. oil-price 
shocks) by excessively adjusting their price (compared with their cost rise levels). 




itself; but it goes beyond the scope of this paper. As mentioned above, we intend 
to focus on industries where price transmission has been baffled, given that IO 
types of models implicitly exclude the possibility of demand-driven inflation. 
Consequently, we will only pay attention to industries with CTC less than 1, 
leaving those “over-shooting” industries for future studies. Accordingly, for 
industries with CTC coefficients larger than 1, we adjust them to 1, implying that 
manufacturers will adjust their price no greater than the level of their cost surge. 
As for most industries with CTCs less than 1, it is clear that many manufacturers 
are not capable of fully transmitting cost to their customers. The reason behind a 
partial transmission in China during oil-price shocks can be attributed to such 




Price control policy in China targets two kinds of commodities: fundamental 
resources and CPI-indexed commodities. This policy is enforced in efforts to 
control inflation and prevent monopoly from encroaching on the public interest. 
While price control policy is implemented out of goodwill and is arguably helpful 
in mitigating the impact of price shocks, it has made price extremely rigid and has 







Even in a market free of price controls (like the U.S.), producers still cannot fully 
transmit cost increases to their customers. This can result from several factors, 
market competition pressure being among one of them. For example, producers 
may want to keep their price level unchanged or even lower (as is the case in 
information industries), which have negative CTCs for both China and the U.S.
3, 
in order to remain competitive in the market, even if their costs have been 
increased. There are also possibilities that demand elasticity is extremely high. 
Therefore a slight rise in price will cause huge decrease in demand, which deters 
producers from lifting their prices. In other cases, prices may be set beforehand in 
annual contracts; therefore producers are prohibited from raising prices, even 
when their costs have been markedly increased. 
  
Technology substitution 
In an economy that is frequently and severely attacked by oil-price shocks, 
producers will gradually find ways to adapt and counteract the negative influence 
of oil-price shocks by improving their manufacturing technologies. For example, 
                                                             
3 This implies that manufacturers lower their prices when costs rise. This may 
result from the highly competitive nature of information industry. Prices of new 




they can use renewable energies instead of oil, or adopt technologies with higher 
energy efficiency. The technology substitution efforts made by producers will help 
cut costs and therefore curb inflation during oil-price shocks. However, this effect 
cannot be realized in the short term, especially when we consider the slow pace of 
technology advancement in China today.   
 
3.3. Oil-price Shocks and General Price Levels 
General Price Level 
Applying both complete and partial transmission IO model to China and the U.S. 
would enable us to simulate price changes in different industries under two 
scenarios when crude oil price doubles, namely, increases by 100%.   
The IO table provides us with the composition of the final residential 
consumption. By using this data as the weighting number, we can have the 
weighted average “general price level” changes under hypothetical oil-price 
shocks. However, it should be pointed out that, although this number offers 
meaningful information regarding how consumers are affected during oil-price 
shocks, the so-called “general price level” is still not equal to the CPI due to 






In an ideal world, China will experience a 4.91% increase in general consumer 
price level under a doubling of oil price after ten iterations (China, Scenario I). 
However, after the pass-through friction is taken into consideration, the general 
price level surge will be significantly mitigated to be only 1.39% (China, Scenario 
II). Also, if the price transmission is complete, the U.S. will see a 1.80% rise in its 
general consumer price level (U.S., Scenario I), while the price level will slightly 
decrease to 1.30% in a partial transmission IO model (U.S., Scenario II). 
 
 
Fig.3 Simulation results of an input-output analysis for China and the U.S. 
 
3.4 Discussion 
Generally speaking, the impact of oil-price shocks on price levels depends on five 
major factors: industrial structure, oil intensity, market factors, price control, and 




manufacturing industry than the service industry will be more prone to oil-price 
shocks. Likewise, an economy with higher oil intensity is more vulnerable to 
oil-price shocks than those with less oil dependence. In a market with less 
favorable market conditions where competition is more intense, manufacturers 
may feel reluctant to raise prices in order to pass through the impact of oil-price 
shocks. However, the price control policy distorts pricing mechanisms and 
mitigates the short-term impact of oil-price shocks on price levels. Moreover, the 
quick adaption to oil-price shocks by technology substitution can help businesses 
overcome oil-price shocks without raising prices. 
In order to understand the impact of the aforementioned factors, we 
categorize the above five factors into two groups: group A (industrial structure and 
energy intensity) and group B (market factors, price control, and technology 
substitution). While the information for factors in group A can be found in the IO 
table, the information contained in group B are embodied in our CTC coefficients 
(See Table 3). 
 
Table 3 
Simulation results and the five major factors in determining the impact of 
oil-price shocks 
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Note: Superscript “u” and “c” represent the U.S. and China, representatively. 
 
With simulation results in the above two scenarios for China and the U.S., 
we now arrange these two groups of factors into the following numerical 
relationships: 
124.91%
cc AA ⋅=                 ( 1 )  
12 123 1.39%
ccccc AABBB ⋅⋅⋅⋅=             ( 2 )  
12 1.80%
uu AA ⋅=                 ( 3 )  
u
12 123 1.30%
uuuu AABBB ⋅⋅⋅⋅=              ( 4 )  
Combining equations (1) and (2), as well as equations (3) and (4), we have   
12328.31%
ccc BBB ⋅⋅= ,  12372.22%
uuu BBB ⋅⋅=  
Here the residual value of ( 123 1 BBB − ⋅⋅) show us the level of inflation that will be 
mitigated by taking factors in group B (market factors, price control, and 




combination of market factors, price control and technology substitution will push 
the inflation rate in China down by 71.69% ( 123 1
ccc B BB − ⋅⋅), while these three 
factors will mitigate the inflation rate in the U.S. only by 21.78% ( 123 1
uuu BBB −⋅⋅). 
Also, the difference between  12
cc A A ⋅ (4.91%) and  12
uu A A ⋅ (1.80%) shows that the 
less industry-oriented economic structure and lower oil intensity in the U.S. help 
mitigate inflation by 3.11% in absolute terms or 63.34% in relative terms. 
To further separate the impact of price control from other influences, we 




Ideally, in the face of an oil shock, some manufacturers may counteract the 
negative impact through technical innovation, by adopting less oil-intensive 
technology and/or substituting oil with other type of energy. Substituting a 
technology to mitigate the impact of oil-price shocks is based on two prerequisites: 
adequate technology competency and quick technology transformation pace. 
Although the reoccurring oil-price shocks have prodded industries to find 
alternative energies or develop more oil-efficient technologies, it will usually take 
quite some time before the technologies come to commercialization. Therefore, 
the effect of technology substitution may not be reflected during the current round 




future. In light of this, we assume that the factor of “technology substitution” can 
be neglected in the near term, both in the U.S. and in China, namely, 
33 100%
uc BB == . 
 
Market factors 
Market factors, such as willingness to remain competitive, high price elasticity 
and fixed contracts, are the major causes behind partial price pass-through, 
especially for a free markets like the U.S.. The significance of market factors in 
determining oil price pass-through is dependent very much on the bargaining 
power of different industries. In a market where competition is very intensive or 
where products have very high price elasticity, suppliers are expected to have 
lower bargaining power and are more likely to bear the cost during oil-price 
shocks, or sign fixed contracts which expose themselves to future cost shocks.   
The terms of trade index compares export price change with import price 
change. A rise in the index means that relative export price increase exceeds 
relative import price increase; in other words, the trade condition is in favor of the 
exporting country with a rise in the bargaining power in international trade. 
Enlightened by this, we employ the terms of trade index published by UNCTAD 
(2010) to quantify the relative bargaining power of the overall economy for China 
and the U.S..   




than that of China in 2008, implying that industries in the U.S. have greater 
bargaining power than those in China. In other words, it is more difficult for 




Fig. 4 Terms of trade indices for China and the U.S., 1980-2009 
Source: UNCTAD (2010). 
 
With this in mind, we assume that the retardant effect of market factors in 
China is 24% greater than that of the U.S., assigning 11 (1 24%)
uc B B = +⋅ . Meanwhile, 
the technology substitution factor can be neglected in the short term, and no price 
control policy is enforced in the U.S., i.e. 
23 3 100%, 100%
uu c BB B == = , 
We have 
1 72.22%
u B = ,  1 58.24%
c B = , 
c
2 48.61% B = . 
The results show that the market factors in the U.S. and China account for 




China’s market is more stagnated than that of the U.S. in terms of transmitting the 
cost pressure during oil-price shocks. Meanwhile, the price control  mitigates 
inflation by 51.39%, indicating that price control in China significantly prevents 
producers from passing through their costs during oil-price shocks. 
 
 
4. Policy Implications 
Our empirical results have shown that China’s price control policy significantly 
lowers the capability of China’s industries in price pass-through during oil shocks. 
This policy prevents oil shocks from quickly spreading into downstream 
industries and thus helps curb inflation in the short term. However, effective as it 
is, the side effects of price control are very destructive for the economy.   
First of all, the policy distorts price adjustment mechanisms. When 
international oil price surges, domestic oil price will not rise simultaneously due 
to an adjustment lag caused by oil price control. With domestic oil prices 
remaining unchanged, manufacturers will increase their current demand for oil 
products, since they expect oil price to rise in the near future. Consequently, oil 
price control turns the price elasticity of downstream manufacturers from negative 
to positive; the higher the international oil prices, the higher the demand, the 
larger the discrepancy between demand and supply for oil products. Price control, 




Secondly, price control causes manipulation and probably amplifies the 
overall inflationary effect. The widening gap between oil supply and demand 
would prod manipulation activities, driving prices in black markets higher and 
higher. This, in turn, increases price expectation in the regulated market and 
exaggerates oil shortage crises, adding enormous pressure on policy makers. 
When the oil price control is eventually relaxed, the oil price is sometimes 
increased more than enough to cover the original international oil price surge, due 
to higher demand for oil products. From an economic point of view, the resulting 
inflation is both pushed by cost and pulled by demand. As a result, although oil 
price control can delay the impact of oil shocks on inflation in the short term, it is 
possible that the overall inflationary effect is greater than that without oil price 
control, especially in the long term, when the expectation of oil price rise is fully 
realized.  
Thirdly, price control discourages technical innovation. Ideally, in a 
market where oil price pass-through is very difficult, manufacturers will be 
seriously hit by oil shocks. In order to mitigate the negative impact, they will try 
to find alternative technologies. On the other hand, in a market where the pricing 
mechanism is less stagnated and manufacturers manage to pass through the cost 
impact, customers will choose products using less oil since their prices are less 
affected by oil shock. A combination of the two factors encourages producers to 
adopt new technologies. By contrast, because of oil price control in China, the 




Therefore, downstream manufacturers have less incentive to reduce oil intensity. 
As a result, as the inflationary effect of oil shocks fully comes into play, the 
producers will be seriously hurt in the long term, since they are not fully prepared 
due to rigidness in oil price pass-through. 
Last but not least, price control squeezes business profits and lowers 
investment incentives. During an oil shock, price control on oil products will 
gradually erode the profits of oil producers, with an increasing discrepancy 
between imported and domestic oil prices. After the government adjusts the 
domestic oil price, however, downstream manufacturers will gradually feel the 
cost pressure when the price shock is gradually transmitted through the industry 
chain. However, for those producers of CPI-indexed commodities under price 
control, they are incapable of further transmitting cost increase. Consequently, 
investment in those industries will be largely cut back, which will in turn have a 
negative impact on the upstream industries. As a result, the investment incentives 
within the whole economy will be greatly diminished, thus leading to lower 
chances of survival for individual business and slower recovery for the whole 
economy. 
All the aforementioned taken into account, although price control can 
offset the impact of oil-price shocks in the short term, it in fact distorts price 
mechanism, exaggerates long-term inflation effect, discourages technical 




control policy on commodities, efforts towards reducing energy intensity and 
adjusting industrial structure can be seen as a more persistent and instructive 
policy tool in combating inflation during oil-price shocks (less industrial structure 
and lower oil intensity in the U.S. help mitigate inflation by 63.34%, compared 
with China).   
In addition, lack of bargaining power is another major reason behind 
China’s unsuccessful oil shock pass-through (this market factor decreases the 
inflation rate by 41.76% for China). In light of this, industrial upgrading can be 
considered as another long-term solution to mitigate the impact of oil shocks on 
China’s economy. 
It should be emphasized that the consequence of relaxing price control 
combined with efforts in reducing energy intensity, adjusting industrial structure 
and industrial upgrading is not as terrible as some may expect. As shown in our 
study, in a free market economy like the U.S., a 100% oil-price increase will only 
raise the inflation rate by 1.30%, which is even lower than our simulation results 








the oil intensity of its economy is still very much higher than that of industrialized 
countries. A combination of the two factors would make China’s economy 
vulnerable to world oil-price shocks. However, China had managed to maintain its 
growth momentum with its CPI less influenced during the 2007-8 oil-price shock. 
In this paper, we attempt to explain China’s lessened vulnerability to oil-price 
shocks by investigating the price control policy in China. To that end, we tailor 
the traditional IO analysis to China’s uniqueness. Taking into consideration the 
baffled price pass-through mechanism in reality, we incorporate the capability of 
transmitting cost into the direct IO table and develop a partial transmission IO 
model. This new approach reflects the frictions in a price transmission process and 
thus enables us to better simulate the cost-driven inflation during oil-price shocks.   
Our simulation results show that under an ideal scenario China will 
experience a 4.91% increase in general price level when oil price doubles; the 
inflation rate will drop significantly to 1.39%, after factoring in the transmission 
friction. By contrast, the inflation rate in the U.S. will only decrease from 1.80% 
under a complete transmission scenario to 1.30% under a partial transmission 
scenario. 
To further identify the factors in determining the impact of oil-price shocks, 
we divide those factors into industrial structure, oil intensity, market factors, price 
control, and technology substitution, and incorporate the five factors into the 




lower industry-oriented economic structure and lower oil intensity in the U.S. help 
mitigate inflation by 3.11% in absolute terms or 63.34% in relative terms. 
Meanwhile, the market factors (including fierce competition, high demand 
elasticity, fixed contract, etc.) in the U.S. and China account for a 21.78% and 
41.76% decrease in the inflation rate, respectively; and the price control in China 
mitigates inflation by 51.39%. 
Based on our quantitative results, we can draw the following conclusions. 
First, reducing oil intensity and adjusting industrial structure can be taken as a 
persistent and instructive policy tool in curbing inflation during oil-price shocks. 
Secondly, lack of bargaining power is another major reason behind China’s partial 
oil price pass-through. Therefore, industrial upgrading is another long-term 
solution to mitigate the impact of oil-price shocks on China’s economy. Thirdly, 
although price control offsets the impact of oil-price shocks in the short term, it 
distorts price adjustment mechanism, exaggerates long-term inflation effect, 
discourages technical innovation and dampens investment incentives. 
Consequently, relaxing price control is a necessary step towards making price 
pass-through mechanism work in China. Finally, the consequences of relaxing 
price control as well as other recommended policies are acceptable and 
controllable. Our simulation results show that in a free market economy like the 
U.S., a doubling of oil price will only raise the inflation rate by 1.30%, which is 
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Appendix Price Control Policy in China 
Despite the fact that prices of most commodities and services are set in the market, 
prices of a few commodities are still under the government’s control in China. 
According to the Price Law, there are two kinds of price control policies: prices 
guided by a government and prices set by a government. For the former one, a 
pricing authority will set a benchmark price and its floating range. The business 
entity should price the commodity or service according to this regulation. As for 
the latter, a pricing authority stipulates the price directly. 
Two sets of pricing catalogues, both at the central government level and at 
the local government level, define prices that should be set or controlled by the 
government. The central pricing catalogue is formulated by the pricing authority 
under the State Council (China’s cabinet), which is now the price department of 
the National Development and Reform Commission, while the local pricing 
catalogue is drafted by the pricing authority of a provincial or municipal 
government, which should be further approved by the State Council. The central 
pricing catalogue was last revised in 2001, cutting pricing categories from 121 to 




Central pricing catalogue (2001 version) 
 
 Category  Content 




commodities  sugar, reserve oil, reserve chemical fertilizer, reserve 
silk,  
2  Tobacco, salt and civil 
explosion equipments 
Tobacco leaf, salt, civil explosion equipments 
3  Chemical fertilizers  Urea, ammonium nitrate, etc. 
4  Important medicines  Stupefacient, specific psychotropic drugs, 
prophylactic, etc. 
5  Textbooks  Textbooks for elementary schools, middle schools, 
universities and colleges 
6  Natural gas  Onshore natural gas 
7  Water    Water of hydraulic projects directly managed by 
central government and cross-provincial hydraulic 
projects 
8  Electricity  Electricity purchasing price without competition, 
electricity retail price 
9  Military goods  Military equipments, army provisions, oil supply for 
military use 
10  Important transportation 
services 
Pipeline transportation, port charge, airplane ticket 
price and discount, railway ticket price, etc. 
11  Post services  Postage for letter, parcel, newspaper, emergent mail, 
etc. 
12  Telecom services  Telecom charge for fixed phone and mobile phone 
13  Important professional 
services 
Financial service, geotechnical survey and design 
service, specific intermediary service 
Source: National Development and Planning Commission (2001). 
 
In addition to controlling prices of commodities and services listed in the 
pricing catalogue, the government withholds the right of using other policy 
instruments to regulate market prices. For example, the price regulation fund can 




price-intervention policy” by limiting profit margin, setting price upper bounds 
and so on (The Price Department of the National Development and Reform 
Commission, 2009). The “temporary price-intervention policy” was employed in 
2003 and 2008 to curb inflation. 
Generally speaking, the price control policies in China today mainly target 
five kinds of commodities and services: a) commodities of great importance to 
national economy and people’s lives, b) commodities using scarce resources, c) 
commodities of a natural monopoly nature, d) important utility services, and e) 
public welfare services. Take oil price as an example: According to current 
regulation, domestic oil prices can be adjusted when the average increase of the 
weighted average oil price of New York, Rotterdam and Singapore continuously 
exceeds 4% within 22 working days. Despite the already long adjustment interval, 
the pricing authority tends to maintain the domestic oil price even if the above 
condition is met, in the name of preventing inflation. As a result, domestic oil 
prices lag far behind international oil prices during an international oil price hike 





Fig.5 Gasoline price in China and the U.S. 
 
Comparing an ideal price increase (using an input-output table) and actual 
price increase (from price indices) provides us with some insights into the impact 
of price control. For example, for industries like natural gas production and supply, 
during the 2007-08 oil-price shock, in order to maintain the profit level, an ideal 
price increase of 26.19% was required. However, the industry only managed to 
increase the price by 7%. Some other industries under price control with a partial 





Fig.6 A comparison between ideal and actual price increases for five 
industries under price control 
 
Despite the still rigorous control on price, it is well recognized that price 
control policy should be eventually eliminated through a gradual price reform. As 
a matter of the fact, price reform since 1978 has greatly deregulated China’s 
market. The categories of commodities and services in pricing catalogue have 
been significantly reduced to 13, compared with nearly 800 at the beginning of the 
reform. As a result, the current share of government regulated goods and services 
only accounts for 4.4%, 2.9% and 7.6% in the total sales of retail commodities, 
farm products and production materials, respectively (The Price Department of 
the National Development and Reform Commission, 2009). NOTE DI LAVORO DELLA FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI 
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